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SHOWCASING: THE POSITIVE SPIN* 
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT** 
This Commentary outlines the positive case for showcasing diversity. 
Patrick Shin and Mitu Gulati criticize showcasing on the grounds that 
appointing women and minorities to board directorships is unreliable 
as a sign of true commitment to diversity and, further, that showcasing 
is detrimental to women and minorities because it treats them as objects 
or “prized trophies.” Drawing on social psychology, this Commentary 
highlights the mechanisms through which showcasing, despite the 
negative features emphasized by Shin and Gulati, also reinforces 
diversity values and strengthens the existing societal consensus in favor 
of diversity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What do companies signal when they showcase female and 
minority members of their corporate boards? Not necessarily more, 
say Patrick Shin and Mitu Gulati, than that they understand that 
diversity is a socially significant issue, and that they can attract 
members of the showcased individual’s minority group, against whom 
they are then probably disinclined to discriminate.1 While this may be 
important information to convey, Shin and Gulati’s focus is on what is 
not reliably signaled by the showcasing of women and minority 
appointments. Specifically, they argue that showcasing is not a true 
indication that the company has achieved diversity, or even that it has 
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 1. Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1032, 
1034–35 (2011). 
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a commitment to achieving it.2 It is not a true indication because 
showcasing is too cheap and easy in relation to the more difficult 
work necessary to achieve genuine diversity.3 Thus, while token board 
appointments can appear to reflect a deeper commitment to diversity, 
they actually predict little about whether a company has made that 
commitment.4 
Showcasing may not warrant as much credit to the companies 
who engage in it as they may seek, but does it do any harm? Yes, say 
Shin and Gulati. Showcasing women and minorities for their value as 
signals treats them as “prized troph[ies]” or “passive emblems.”5 This 
treatment is dehumanizing and “corrosive to their status in the 
organizational community.”6 It also reinforces stereotypes that 
women and minorities lack merit for top-level corporate positions.7 
Shin and Gulati are careful to say that their concerns are not 
about showcasing per se, but rather about showcasing for the purpose 
of signaling a commitment to diversity,8 which they believe “implies a 
morally offensive way of thinking about the value of diversity-
oriented hiring or promotional practices.”9 Accordingly, this 
Commentary responds to that single, limited matter: whether it is 
acceptable and appropriate for companies to showcase female and 
minority board appointments for signaling purposes. While the 
response acknowledges the validity of some of Shin and Gulati’s 
concerns, it focuses on the shinier side of the showcasing coin. In 
particular, it argues that showcasing has the potential to strengthen a 
positive societal view of diversity, even when it does not predictably 
signal a genuine commitment to that diversity. 
Part I spells out this positive case for showcasing. This case starts 
with the assumption that companies who make diversity 
appointments and then advertise them must believe that others view 
diversity favorably and thus will think well of them if they engage in 
it. Showcasing not only exploits this favorable view of diversity, but 
also furthers people’s internalization of this view and their 
commitment to act consistently with it.  
 
 2. Id. at 1032. 
 3. Id. at 1034–35. 
 4. Id. at 1025–26, 1034–35; see also Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 451–52 
(2008) (arguing that board diversity is easy to mimic and thus has little signaling value). 
 5. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1040–41. 
 6. Id. at 1040. 
 7. Id. at 1041 n.60. 
 8. Id. at 1043. 
 9. Id. 
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Part II then examines the positive case for the appointment of 
women and minorities to corporate boards. It begins with a discussion 
of the two principle rationales typically used to justify identity-
conscious appointments: nondiscrimination and diversity. Drawing on 
how these rationales have functioned to bolster the case for diversity 
within juries and among judges, Part II briefly explores their benefits 
and limitations, and notes the mixed empirical evidence that underlies 
them. It concludes by retrieving a rationale mentioned in passing by 
Shin and Gulati—that actions to promote diversity serve the purpose 
of expressing an important societal ideal.10 The commitment to 
corporate board diversity (and diversity in other domains) is hard to 
explain without this expressive rationale, which does not depend 
upon empirical evidence that diversity achieves other instrumental 
goals. Part III connects the positive case for showcasing to this 
expressive function. 
I.  THE CASE FOR SHOWCASING 
Shin and Gulati’s thesis is that company showcasing of female 
and minority board appointments is misleading as a signal of a 
genuine commitment to diversity and has hidden costs to the women 
and minorities who are showcased. This two-part account is plausible, 
as far as it goes, but it does not do justice to the positive potential 
benefits of showcasing for strengthening nondiscrimination and 
diversity norms. For one thing, it ignores these possible benefits. For 
another thing, it reflects a cynicism that has the potential to weaken 
the diversity ideal it seeks to uphold. Shin and Gulati criticize 
showcasing motivated by a desire to signal because it “undercuts the 
basic premise that animates the evidential view of the value of 
diversity.”11 Ironically, their thesis that signaling is corrupting has the 
quality of a self-fulfilling prophecy, which may itself undercut the 
commitment that diversity requires. 
This Part examines the positive benefits neglected in the Shin 
and Gulati account. It argues that expression matters. The expression 
of positive views about a subject has the potential to reinforce those 
positive views both among the people expressing the views and their 
audiences. Showcasing diversity appointments expresses a pro-
diversity point of view, and thereby, under the right conditions, 
enhances a pro-diversity norm. Similarly, showcasing is also an action 
that reinforces the underlying commitments upon which it is based. 
 
 10. Id. at 1020–21. 
 11. Id. at 1041. 
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A. Expression Matters 
In their critique of showcasing as a signal of commitment to 
diversity, Shin and Gulati are concerned that some people will 
mistakenly overread the showcasing signal and attribute more credit 
to a company than its actual commitment warrants. This concern 
needs to be put in the broader context of business communication, 
through which all companies seek to portray themselves or their 
products in as good a light as they reasonably can, often through 
subliminal messages. Philip Morris advertisements build the Marlboro 
brand with athletic, sexy, masculine figures in the great, clean 
outdoors.12 BP Oil narrates stories of local New Orleans workers to 
convey the message that it will take care of the damage caused by the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion (even as it seeks other parties with 
whom to share responsibility for that damage).13 Similarly, when 
companies draw attention to their “diverse” board appointments, 
they are hoping to create favorable associations between the 
company and its commitment to diversity. Like other forms of 
business promotion and advertising, bringing these appointments to 
the attention of others plays on people’s subliminal receptivity and 
gullibility. “Puffery,” however, is generally tolerated in the business 
world, particularly with respect to claims that are highly subjective 
and hard to disprove.14 
Shin and Gulati argue that one reason diversity cannot be 
reliably signaled by diversity appointments is that the concept of 
diversity is indeterminate, contextual, and subjective.15 But they 
appear to miss the full implications of this observation. Preliminarily, 
because of the subjectivity and indeterminacy of diversity, a company 
that makes diversity appointments could readily perceive itself to be 
 
 12. See, e.g., Marlboro Man, STANFORD UNIV.: THE BILL LANE CTR. FOR THE AM. 
W., http://west.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/pager.php?id=33 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).  
 13. See Gulf of Mexico Response, BP, http://www.bp.com/extendedsection 
genericarticle.do?categoryId=40&contentId=7061813 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 14. See, e.g., New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 
195, 235 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding as puffery a gun manufacturer’s claim that the Model P 
handgun was the “gun that won the west”); Thompson Med. Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 643 
F. Supp. 1190, 1199–1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that weight-loss pill manufacturer’s 
representations that the pill would cause you to “Lose Weight Fast” was puffery and not 
misleading); In re Dannon Milk Prods., Inc., 61 F.T.C. 840, 841 (1962) (holding as 
meaningless puff Dannon’s claim that its yogurt is “nature’s perfect food”); Gold v. Univ. 
of Bridgeport Sch. of Law, 562 A.2d 570, 572–73 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that the 
law school’s advertising to prospective students of opportunities for “friendly interaction” 
with faculty was “akin to mere ‘puffing’ ” and could not support liability for fraudulent 
misrepresentation). 
 15. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1027–31. 
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committed to diversity, according to its own (probably vague, 
indeterminate, and also self-serving) understanding of that term. In 
other words, just as there is little objective sense in which it could be 
said that a company has committed to, or accomplished, diversity, so 
also there is little meaningful sense in which a company can be said to 
misrepresent its commitment to diversity when it draws attention to 
its women and minority board members. 
More importantly, Shin and Gulati ignore the potential for the 
continual redefinition and evolution that the elasticity of diversity 
allows. Elasticity means opportunity. Those who engage in efforts to 
achieve diversity, or to advertise those efforts, participate in shaping 
the meaning of diversity and the attitudes others should have toward 
it. Thus, when companies signal a commitment to diversity to further 
their reputation, they also signal that diversity is a positive ideal. 
People assume that companies exist to make a profit and take actions 
to serve their own best interests. They therefore also assume that 
when companies are willing to put their reputations behind diversity 
appointments, these companies must believe that diversity is an 
affirmative, worthwhile ideal—a belief that might, in turn, influence 
their own attitudes about diversity. 
The enhancement of people’s positive attitudes and commitment 
toward diversity is critical to their willingness and ability to avoid the 
kinds of discrimination that are now most common in this society. 
Advancing any societal goal is made easier by people’s commitment 
to that goal.16 Buy-in is especially important, however, in spheres of 
behavior that the state cannot directly measure, monitor, or control.17 
Most people, out of fear of getting caught and paying the price, are 
likely to refrain from running red lights, stealing from others, and 
torching property for which they hold under-water mortgages. In 
contrast, there are important social goals that the state cannot readily 
enforce—for example, the goal that parents provide to their children 
 
 16. See Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal 
Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 
227, 241 (2000) (citing studies showing that people do better in protecting the environment 
and overcoming alcohol and drug addiction when they are internally motivated to do so); 
Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of 
Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 73 
(2000) (citing studies showing that people do better at losing weight, taking medications, 
and engaging in school or personal relationships when they are internally motivated to do 
so). 
 17. On the importance of alternatives to state coercion as a means of obtaining 
compliance with the law’s desired goals, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE 
LAW 22–23 (1990). 
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good discipline, moral guidance, intellectual stimulation, and love. As 
to these matters, the state is largely dependent upon other sources of 
motivation. Social norms reinforced by family, friends, church, and 
even popular culture are the most likely sources of parenting norms.18 
The state relies on the internalization of these norms when it leaves 
the important job of raising children up to parents.19 
Because, as Shin and Gulati note, diversity is a difficult ideal to 
define, legally mandate, and monitor,20 coercion is not likely to 
accomplish it; as with good parenting, its achievement depends upon 
positive social norms and people’s voluntary and internalized 
commitment to those norms. Laws and employment policies can deter 
supervisors from blatantly treating women and minorities worse than 
other employees, and they can protect employees from the most 
egregious forms of harassment based on sex or race.21 Today, 
however, discrimination rarely occurs as explicitly and blatantly as it 
did in the early reported Title VII cases.22 More often, it takes the 
form of harmful, stereotype-based processing errors that are not easy 
to discern, even by those who make those errors. For example, people 
tend to form initial impressions of others based on unconscious 
stereotypes about them and then unconsciously remember, organize, 
and evaluate subsequent information based on these same biased 
impressions.23 They believe their evaluations are objective, even when 
their unconscious biases have infected their evaluative judgments.24 
Discrimination also takes the form of various types of involuntary 
 
 18. For basic works on the importance of social norms as an alternative or supplement 
to legal norms, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, 
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of 
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). 
 19. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
49–52 (1973) (arguing that the law cannot supervise interpersonal relationships including 
the parent-child relationship); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 
98 YALE L.J. 293, 301–02 (1988) (arguing that good parenting depends upon the “capacity 
[for] moral decision making” and responsibility, which the law undermines when it tries 
too hard to control parental behavior). 
 20. See Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1027–31. 
 21. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of 
Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1956 
(2009). 
 22. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337–38 (1977); 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426–28 (1971). 
 23. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1167, 1209, 1213 (1995). 
 24. Id. at 1214. 
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behaviors, like “lack of eye contact and warmth, tensing of facial 
muscles, increased blinking, anxious voice tone, . . . and [the] 
maintenance of physical distance and formality.”25 These responses, 
too, negatively affect the working conditions of members of some 
groups and their ability to perform their jobs.26 Yet they are also 
usually unintended and thus difficult for the law itself to curtail.27 To 
combat these types of behaviors, people must be motivated to self-
monitor, pursuant to nondiscrimination norms that they have deeply 
internalized.28 
The appointment of women and minorities to positions of 
influence is one among an array of social influences that can help 
facilitate the internalization of nondiscrimination and diversity values. 
Research in a variety of settings suggests that the presence of female 
and minority leadership positions operates indirectly to reduce 
implicit bias.29 Positive role models help to dispel the assumption that 
 
 25. Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1896–97 (citing sources); Jennifer Crocker et al., Social 
Stigma, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 504, 513 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 
4th ed. 1998); John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial 
Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 63 (2002); Susan T. Fiske, What We 
Know About the Problem of the Century: Lessons from Social Science to the Law, and 
Back, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND 
REALITIES 59, 60, 63 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005).  
 26. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual 
Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 805–
06 (1995) (discussing how subtle cues that remind ethnic minority students of their 
stigmatized status undermine achievement on academic tests); Carl O. Word, The 
Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 109, 119 (1974) (showing how negative nonverbal 
behaviors produce poorer performance in job interview setting among both whites and 
blacks). 
 27. Indeed, as to behaviors grounded in unconscious attitudes, legal coercion may 
even make the problem worse. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1936–41. 
 28. See id. at 1931–34. 
 29. For examples of research suggesting this proposition, see M. ELIZABETH 
TIDBALL ET AL., TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY: LESSONS AND LEGACIES FOR 
EDUCATING THE MAJORITY 77–78 (1999) (finding a strong link between frequency of 
counterstereotypic female role models on campus and the students’ commitment to 
counterstereotypic careers); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the 
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of 
Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806–07 
(2001) (describing experimental research showing that exposure to admired black figures 
and disliked white exemplars resulted in lower scores for implicit bias in comparison with 
control subjects); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to 
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender 
Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 642, 653–54 (2004) (describing 
research demonstrating that women who attended women’s colleges where they had 
frequent contact with women faculty showed less automatic bias after one year than those 
who attended coeducational institutions where the contact with women leaders was 
relatively less frequent). 
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members of some groups are not sufficiently qualified to take on 
leadership roles, and they redefine expectations of whom people 
expect to see in leadership roles.30 To have this positive effect it is 
necessary to overcome the force of a phenomenon sometimes 
referred to as “prototype subtyping,” whereby people view successful 
women and minorities as exceptions to the general rule (the rule that 
white men are more competent than others), rather than as a reason 
to modify race or gender stereotypes they hold.31 But showcasing 
helps to bring the kind of positive attention to diversity appointments 
that addresses this phenomenon constructively. The higher the 
position32 and the more examples people can easily retrieve of 
competent women and minorities in positions of authority33—to 
which, again, showcasing can help draw attention—the more effective 
these counterstereotypes are likely to be in weakening the 
stereotypes that such positions are beyond the ability of women and 
minorities.34 
A factor especially important to how people process and 
internalize information about women and minorities is the perceived 
 
 30. See, e.g., Dasgupta & Asgari, supra note 29, at 653–54; see also infra notes 37–38 
(citing studies confirming the importance of organizational leadership committed to 
diversity).  
 31. Prototype subtyping is explained in Miles Hewstone, Contact and Categorization: 
Social Psychological Interventions to Change Intergroup Relations, in STEREOTYPES AND 
STEREOTYPING 323, 338–41 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996). 
 32. One study, for example, links the rising prominence of now-President Barack 
Obama during his presidential campaign with a significant decrease in implicit bias against 
blacks. See generally E. Ashby Plant et al., The Obama Effect: Decreasing Implicit 
Prejudice and Stereotyping, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (2009). 
 33. Repeated exposure increases “construct accessibility,” which enables the 
counterstereotypes to actually alter stereotypes. See E. Tory Higgins & Gillian King, 
Accessibility of Social Constructs: Information-Processing Consequences of Individual and 
Contextual Variability, in PERSONALITY, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 69, 71 
(Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom eds., 1981); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., 
Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some Implications for the Study of Person 
Memory and Interpersonal Judgments, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 841, 851–52 
(1980). 
 34. Direct contact between these women and minorities also, under the right 
conditions, will help to break down barriers and reduce stereotypes. See Bartlett, supra 
note 21, at 1953–55 (citing studies that demonstrate how equal status, common goals, 
interdependence, and positive support in the workplace can cause “people to be less fixed 
in their own views, and more careful about assessing new information and attitudes”); 
Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Allport’s Intergroup Contact Hypothesis: Its 
History and Influence, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY YEARS AFTER 
ALLPORT 262, 264–66 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2005) (reviewing studies updating 
Gordon Allport’s “contact hypothesis”); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 981 (2006) (arguing, on the basis of empirical 
studies, that implicit bias will be reduced as workers have more contact with people whom 
they previously stereotyped). 
BARTLETT.FPP 3/30/2011 8:39 AM 
2011] SHOWCASING: THE POSITIVE SPIN 1063 
 
norms of others around them. A series of studies from the University 
of Maryland suggest that subtle cues about peer racial attitudes 
influence the attitudes of others, who unconsciously come to see 
those attitudes as their own.35 This research involved college students, 
who were influenced in their views about race and gender by subtle 
cues from other students they did not know, in contexts in which they 
were unlikely to meet again.36 On the basis of these studies, one 
would expect that the perceived beliefs and attitudes of company 
leaders, including workplace supervisors, officers, and other top-level 
personnel, would be influential with respect to the norms people 
absorb and make their own in the workplace. Many studies, in fact, 
document strong, positive associations between successful diversity 
strategies and support for these strategies by top management.37 The 
perceived beliefs of leaders influence the beliefs of those they lead, up 
and down the corporate ladder. Indeed, there is some evidence that 
awareness of race and gender issues by the leadership of an 
organization is a better predictor of diversity success in the 
organization than a number of other possible factors, including the 
race or sex of the leader.38 
 
 35. This research is reported in Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived 
Consensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 649 (2001), and Charles Stangor et al., Changing 
Racial Beliefs by Providing Consensus Information, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 486, 493 (2001). 
 36. Among the relevant studies, see Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and 
Condoning Racism: A Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 993, 995 (1994); Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Reducing the Expression of Racial 
Prejudice, 2 PSYCHOL. SCI. 101, 103 (1991); Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 35, at 651; 
Stangor et al., supra note 35, at 493. 
 37. See, e.g., E. Holly Buttner et al., The Influence of Organizational Diversity 
Orientation and Leader Attitude on Diversity Activities, 18 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 356, 
364, 366 (2006) (citing the importance of diversity awareness and organizational attitudes); 
Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence from 
Corporate Diversity Programs, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 279, 295 (2007) (“[C]ommitted 
leadership, where women and minorities make it to the top ten executive positions, is 
clearly important in the corporate world.”); David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, The 
Three Cs of Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND 
DISCRIMINATION 239, 249 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) (arguing that without strong 
leadership, positive effects of contact between members of different groups is negated); 
Sara Rynes & Benson Rosen, A Field Survey of Factors Affecting the Adoptions and 
Perceived Success of Diversity Training, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 247, 263 (1995) 
(discussing generally that management’s involvement affects the adoption and perception 
of diversity training); see also Dobbin & Kalev, supra, at 294 (concluding that diverse 
corporate leadership at the top increases diversity through the company). 
 38. See, e.g., E. Holly Buttner et al., Impact of Leader Racial Attitude on Ratings of 
Causes and Solutions for an Employee of Color Shortage, 73 J. BUS. ETHICS 129, 140 
(2007) (summarizing survey research showing that a leader’s awareness of racial issues is 
BARTLETT.FPP 3/30/2011 8:39 AM 
1064 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
 
Positive attitudes strengthen positive attitudes. Conversely, 
negative attitudes will tend to reinforce negative attitudes,39 although 
sometimes norm violations draw attention to the norms, and thereby 
reinforce rather than weaken them. For example, when a company 
that claims attachment to diversity does not appear to live by that 
commitment, it may draw criticism that will strengthen the ideal of 
diversity that the company has violated.40 The more diversity is 
viewed cynically, however, the more likely even diversity successes 
will be processed in a cynical way. When this happens, not only does 
the diversity norm take a hit, but companies lose their public relations 
incentive to engage in the behaviors that might otherwise be worth 
showcasing. 
Shin and Gulati are concerned not just about false signals, but 
about harm to individuals that comes from showcasing, whether or 
not a company has a true commitment to diversity. Using individual 
diversity appointments to signal a diversity commitment, they argue, 
amounts to treating those individuals like “prized troph[ies] . . . 
valuable as an emblem of the effort required to win it, but not 
something that posseses any value in itself.”41 This, Shin and Gulati 
rightly point out, “is an objectionable way of regarding any person” 
and “entails a failure of moral respect for those individuals.”42 
The concern about dignitary harm is legitimate. It should be 
weighed, of course, against the diminution of diversity appointments 
that would likely result if companies receive no public relations 
benefit for making such appointments. Moreover, whether dignitary 
harm occurs, or at least the degree of it, depends in part on the 
 
more strongly associated with commitment to cultural change and minority recruitment 
than sex or ethnicity of the leader); Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linnehan, Formalized 
HRM Structures: Coordinating Equal Employment Opportunity or Concealing 
Organizational Practices?, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 787, 809 (1995) (finding that top managers’ 
attitudes are significant predictors of effective equal opportunity efforts); Rynes & Rosen, 
supra note 37, at 263 (finding data about success of diversity training, or lack thereof, 
better explained by importance of the values and beliefs of top managers than by their 
gender, race, or ethnicity). 
 39. See Stangor et al., supra note 35, at 493. 
 40. A recent account of the failure of the Bloomberg administration in New York City 
to appoint more women and minorities to top administrative positions is typical. The 
account reports criticisms of Mayor Bloomberg’s latest round of major appointments 
because all are white and all but one are male, and it also reports a concession by Mayor 
Bloomberg that his administration has fallen short of achieving its diversity goals. Both the 
criticisms, and Bloomberg’s response, presuppose that diversity is a positive goal, thereby 
arguably reinforcing that goal. See David W. Chen & Jo Craven McGinty, Setting Diversity 
as Hallmark, Mayor Falls Far Short of a Vow, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2010, at A1. 
 41. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1040.  
 42. Id. at 1040–41. 
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normative context. When showcasing occurs in a context in which 
diversity is seen to be highly valued, dignitary harm should be less 
than when showcasing is viewed cynically. If so, encouraging 
companies to tell diversity stories that proudly link minority and 
female appointments to their reputation would be more fruitful than 
discouraging showcasing as opportunistic and disrespectful. 
B. Action Also Matters 
Showcasing is not only an implicit expression of attitude that can 
influence the attitudes of others, but it is also an action. Action taken 
influences the commitment to act consistently with that action in the 
future.43 Thus, like the expression of positive diversity norms, action 
by company leaders—even symbolic action—has the potential to 
change the attitudes of the leaders themselves, as well as those of the 
people who pay attention to these leaders. 
Extensive research supports the proposition that a person’s 
actions influence her attitudes. One line of experimental research in 
an area known as “biased scanning” suggests that the experience of 
playing a particular role or advocating a particular position shifts a 
person’s attitudes toward that role or position.44 For example, 
students who were asked in an experimental setting to argue for a 
particular position were more likely later to register more attitude 
change toward that position than when they simply heard others 
arguing for it.45 The more people are motivated to argue the position 
or assume an assigned role, the stronger the effect. In one study, 
children offered prizes to write an essay that went counter to their 
attitudes about comic book characters were more likely to change 
these attitudes than those who were not offered prizes.46 
 
 43. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1935; see also LEON PETRAZYCKI, LAW AND 
MORALITY 301 (Hugh W. Babb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1955) (n.d.) (describing the 
bilateral process in which action and attitude are coordinated and reinforced). 
 44. See Anthony G. Greenwald, The Openmindedness of the Counterattitudinal Role 
Player, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 375, 375 (1969) (finding that when study 
subjects expected to have to argue later for a view contrary to their own, they tended to 
shift their own attitudes in that direction); James M. Olson & Jeff Stone, The Influence of 
Behavior on Attitudes, in THE HANDBOOK OF ATTITUDES 223, 224–26 (Dolores 
Albarracín et al. eds., 2005) (summarizing studies on biased scanning). See generally Barry 
R. Schlenker & James V. Trudeau, Impact of Self-Presentations of Private Self-Beliefs: 
Effects of Prior Self-Beliefs and Misattribution, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 22 
(1990) (analyzing the effect of strategic self-presentation on changes in beliefs). 
 45. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Rosita D. Albert, Acceptance and Recall of 
Improvised Arguments, 8 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 33 (1968). This 
experiment is summarized in Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 224. 
 46. See Herbert C. Kelman, Attitude Change as a Function of Response Restriction, 6 
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Another body of research supports the hypothesis, known as self-
perception theory, that individuals infer their own attitudes and 
beliefs from the same types of behavioral cues as they use in inferring 
the attitudes and beliefs of others.47 Self-perception theory predicts 
that people who have acted in a certain way, even if that action was 
thoughtless or manipulated, are more likely to act in the future based 
on the beliefs that are consistent with those actions.48 To illustrate, in 
one experiment, people who had been asked to put a “be a safe 
driver” sticker in a window of their home were much more likely than 
others to agree subsequently to display a large, unattractive “Drive 
Carefully” sign in their yard.49 People not only draw conclusions 
about their own attitudes based on the actions they take, but also 
draw conclusions about their motives. Research has shown, for 
example, that people who are asked to do a task without any reward 
are more likely to believe that the activity was a pleasurable one, and 
thus are more likely to continue that activity thereafter without a 
reward, than those whose initial behavior was compensated.50 
Cognitive dissonance theory offers another explanation for how 
actions can influence attitudes. According to cognitive dissonance 
theory, when individuals experience a conflict between their actions 
and attitudes, they seek to alleviate the resulting discomfort.51 One of 
the ways they do so52 is to change their attitudes to conform to their 
behaviors.53 
 
HUM. REL. 185, 202 (1953). This experiment is summarized in Olson & Stone, supra note 
44, at 225. 
 47. Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 249–50, 253. See generally Mark P. Zanna et al., 
Self-Perception and Attitude-Behavior Consistency, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 252 (1981) (describing research showing that giving an individual the opportunity to 
infer his religious attitudes based on his past participation in religious behaviors increased 
the consistency between behavior and attitude). 
 48. Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 249–50. 
 49. See Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The 
Foot-in-the-Door Technique, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 199–202 (1966). 
 50. See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic 
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 109–10 (1971) (finding that when 
money is used as an external reward, intrinsic motivation diminishes); Mark R. Lepper et 
al., Undermining Children’s Interest with Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the 
“Overjustification” Effect, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 135 (1973) (finding 
that children who were not rewarded for drawing pictures with magic markers drew more 
pictures later during free play time than children who were initially rewarded). 
 51. Leon Festinger first identified cognitive dissonance theory in 1957. See generally 
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (setting forth the basic 
theory of cognitive dissonance). Since then, cognitive dissonance theory has evolved into a 
number of different sub-theories and models, described in Olson & Stone, supra note 44, 
at 226–49. 
 52. For other ways, including reconciling their actions to conform to their attitudes, or 
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These theories suggest the different mechanism by which people 
may become more committed to diversity values when they act as if 
they already had that commitment. Just as the repetitive participation 
in religious or patriotic rituals can reinforce the belief structure 
associated with those rituals,54 so also taking steps—even small, 
nondeliberate ones—that presume that diversity is a positive social 
goal can cause people to become more committed to that 
presumption and more likely to define their world, their company, 
and themselves in relation to it. This goes for leaders as well as 
followers. A leader may become more committed to a position he 
undertook to espouse, even if he took that position initially only for 
its public relations value. Action is especially likely to have an effect 
on attitudes when the attitudes initially were relatively unformed, or 
ambivalent.55 
Shin and Gulati have a “lingering worry”56 that justifying actions 
based on the attitudes they help further has the unsavory “character 
of manipulation, as of social-psychological engineering.”57 This 
concern is misplaced. First, the issue raised by corporate showcasing 
does not raise the usual concern about social engineering, namely, 
state-imposed requirements designed to force people to conform their 
attitudes to state-sponsored propaganda.58 To the contrary, corporate 
 
staying away from situations or people who trigger the dissonance, see Olson & Stone, 
supra note 44, at 227–28 (citing FESTINGER, supra note 51, at 19–22, 24, 31). 
 53. Olson & Stone, supra note 44, at 233, 237. 
 54. For two essays exploring the positive link between ritual and belief, see generally 
Stephanie Kaza, Becoming a Real Person, 20 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUD. 45 (2000) 
(explaining how Buddhist ritual reinforces Buddhist belief); Jay T. Rock, The Ongoing 
Creation of Loving Community: Christian Ritual and Ethics, 20 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN 
STUD. 90 (2000) (stating the same proposition in relation to Christianity). 
 55. See, e.g., Rob W. Holland et al., On the Nature of Attitude-Behavior Relations: The 
Strong Guide, the Weak Follow, 32 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 869, 874–75 (2002) (finding 
that people with weak attitudes toward Greenpeace were more affected by either donating 
money (affected positively), or declining to donate money (affected negatively), to the 
organization than people with strong attitudes). 
 56. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1044. 
 57. Id. 
 58. This social engineering concern underlines the opposition of some people to a 
wide range of government policies, such as a progressive income tax, affirmative action for 
women and minorities, and restrictions on religious exercise. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 632 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (denouncing the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of a religious invocation or benediction at a public school graduation as a 
form of social engineering); Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social 
Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1318 (1986) (arguing that affirmative action in the 
electoral process on behalf of racial minorities amounts to inappropriate social 
engineering); William C. Duncan, Title IX at Thirty: Unanswered Questions, 3 MARGINS 
211, 228 (2003) (arguing that federal Title IX regulations are aimed at achieving social 
engineering rather than opening up sports participation opportunities for women); Eric 
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showcasing is an activity undertaken by a company, pursuing freely 
what it perceives to be its own interests. 
More to the point, the attitudinal effects of an activity are not 
irrelevant to judgments about the desirability of that activity. Much of 
what passes for analysis of what our laws should be—including law 
and economic analysis59—turns on an evaluation of the incentives 
those laws create for people to behave in certain, socially beneficial 
ways. Consideration of the psychological dimensions of people’s 
motivations and actions in the diversity context adds significantly to 
these now-traditional forms of analysis.60 When it comes to 
discrimination, indeed, noneconomic motivations are likely to be 
more significant and powerful than economic ones.61 Not only is it 
appropriate to take into account these noneconomic motivations, but 
any analysis of what it takes to end discrimination would be 
incomplete without them. 
In sum, before dismissing showcasing as a disingenuous gesture 
that may harm those it purports to benefit, it is necessary to consider 
its positive potential to reinforce a positive view of diversity. While 
the empirical basis for predicting or measuring this potential is not 
fully developed, existing research suggests that such reinforcement 
can be expected to better facilitate people’s internalization of 
diversity values than more negative, regulatory efforts. Commitment 
to diversity cannot be effectively commanded; it comes, rather, 
through the absorption of community norms and expectations. 
Showcasing corporate board appointments of women and minorities 
is one activity through which positive community norms and 
expectations about diversity can be expressed. In aligning the 
company with diversity goals, showcasing reiterates the positive value 
of diversity. It also constitutes action, which reinforces the positive 
view of diversity upon which that action is based. 
 
Gouvin, Radical Tax Reform, Municipal Finance, and the Conservative Agenda, 56 
RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 415 (2004) (explaining conservative advocacy for a consumption 
tax to replace a progressive income tax as a way to reduce opportunities for the state to 
engage in social engineering). 
 59. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2007) 
(showing the important role of economic analysis across a variety of fields). 
 60. Konrad & Linnehan, supra note 38, at 807–08; see also RICHARD H. THALER & 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS 8 (2008) (drawing on psychological principles to identify governmental 
policies that might facilitate improved decision making by individuals for their own 
benefit). 
 61. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1904–20 (identifying the social and psychological 
dimensions of race and gender bias). 
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The further case for showcasing turns on the reasons why 
diversity might be desirable. Part II explores the possibilities. 
II.  THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY 
Whether showcasing serves the goal of diversity requires further 
exploration of the purpose of diversity. The two reasons mentioned 
most frequently in the papers to this conference are: (1) that diversity 
reduces discrimination, and (2) that diversity makes “business sense,” 
in terms of improved function and efficiency. This Part examines 
these two rationales, including the mixed evidence pertaining to the 
difference race and gender make on juries, among judges, and within 
corporate boards. It then briefly considers a third alternative 
mentioned in passing by Shin and Gulati—that diversity is justified by 
its expressive function, as much as, or perhaps more than, its 
instrumental rationales. 
A. The Discrimination and Business Rationales 
The discrimination rationale assumes that women and minorities 
are largely absent from corporate boards because they are the victims 
of discrimination, or conditions of inequality that have accumulated 
over time. The addition of women and minority members to 
corporate boards helps to correct past discrimination.62 Women and 
minorities might also serve as role models or help “debias” boards 
and the companies they serve through contact, familiarity, and other 
factors that reduce stereotypes.63 What these possible benefits have in 
common is the assumption that sex and race distinctions are the 
product of bias and stereotypes, not real differences.64 
 
 62. Highlighting the nondiscrimination case for diversity in this conference are Lisa 
M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
855, 885 (2011) (“[D]iversity advocates must create a strategy that effectively incorporates 
and validates moral and social justifications.”); James A. Fanto, Lawrence M. Solan & 
John M. Darley, Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 921, 935 (2011) (arguing 
that “nondiscrimination has become a social norm in its own right,” and that diversity 
“reflects and promotes antidiscriminatory norms”); Jerry Kang, The Mismatch Critique: 
Comment on Fanto, Solan, and Darley, 89 N.C. L. REV. 937, 944 (2011) (“Diversity 
advocates should frame rhetorically the task as one of basic justice and fairness.”). 
 63. See Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1044; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 34, 
at 980–82 (citing evidence that population diversity reduces implicit bias). 
 64. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (holding 
that Title VII provides for the application of disparate impact analysis to subjective job 
criteria, given the problem of subconscious racial stereotypes and prejudices); Orr v. Orr, 
440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979) (holding as a matter of constitutional law, in the context of an 
Alabama alimony statute, that sex cannot be used as a proxy for economic need).  
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In contrast, the business rationale (or what I also will refer to, 
interchangeably, as the diversity rationale) assumes that women and 
minorities bring significant differences to corporate boards that 
improve corporate performance in some measurable way.65 They may 
bring talents or competencies that are not otherwise present,66 or they 
may bring different life experiences or perspectives that improve 
decision making or otherwise change the group dynamic in a positive 
way.67 Whatever the differences might be, the business rationale 
assumes that they are real and not necessarily the product of bias and 
stereotypes. 
Courts sometimes consider nondiscrimination and diversity as 
distinct justifications; in any particular case, one may be valid while 
the other is not. In the employment context, for example, the 
Supreme Court on a number of occasions has held that a Title VII 
claim requires proof of discrimination and that, without proof of past 
discrimination, creating or maintaining diversity is an insufficient 
basis for sex- and race-conscious hiring or promotion decisions.68 In 
 
 65. For the conference papers that primarily address the business case for diversity, 
see generally Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Board Diversity and Corporate 
Performance: A Review of the Psychological Evidence, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011); Lissa L. 
Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: Narratives of 
Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759 (2011); Sung Hui Kim, The Diversity 
Double Standard, 89 N.C. L. REV. 945 (2011). 
 66. See Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 65–66 (2009). This rationale, rather than the equality/justice 
rationale, is reported to have been the one supporting Norway’s 2003 law that the boards 
of all non-privately owned companies be comprised of at least thirty-three to fifty percent 
of each gender. See id. (quoting a drafter as justifying the new law on competitive grounds, 
that it would help to ensure appointing the most competent people). 
 67. See Karen A. Jehn et al., Why Differences Make a Difference: A Field Study of 
Diversity, Conflict, and Performance in Workgroups, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 741, 756–60 (1999) 
(finding that greater informational diversity leads to greater success in workgroups than 
social category diversity or value diversity); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and 
Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury 
Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 608–09 (2006) (considering 
minority impact on jury deliberations); cf. Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly, 
III, Demography and Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 
RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 77, 115–17 (1998) (summarizing evidence showing the 
negative effects of diversity on group communication, integration, harmony, and 
efficiency). 
 68. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 (1987) (holding that 
affirmative action to respond to a “manifest imbalance” in traditionally sex-segregated job 
categories could be justified in order to eliminate the effects of employment 
discrimination, not to attain a permanently balanced workforce); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1563 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that the layoff of a 
white teacher of equal seniority to a minority teacher in order to further the school 
district’s interest in maintaining racial diversity in its business education department was 
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).  
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contrast, in the educational context, the diversity argument has 
tended to be more compelling.69 
At other times, the discrimination and diversity rationales have 
been drawn on simultaneously or interchangeably, as if the arguments 
overlap, each filling in gaps left by the other. This blended approach 
describes the defense of corporate board diversity offered by the 
papers to this conference,70 and thus warrants closer examination. The 
approach has been particularly evident in a pair of Supreme Court 
cases establishing the importance of including minorities and women 
on juries. 
The race case is Batson v. Kentucky.71 In Batson, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that systematically excluding potential jurors on 
account of their race implicated both (1) the “evil” of race exclusion 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure,72 and (2) the 
right of a defendant to have a jury of peers with backgrounds 
representative of his own.73 The former highlights the harm of 
discrimination; the latter relies on the benefits of diversity. 
The gender case is J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.74 In J.E.B., the 
Supreme Court also combined discrimination and diversity rationales, 
there holding that it was unconstitutional for prosecutors to use their 
peremptory challenges to systematically exclude individuals from 
juries because of their sex.75 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the 
exclusion of women from juries was based on untrue stereotypes 
about women’s differences, which the law condemns.76 Alongside that 
reasoning, he also insisted that the “diverse and representative 
character of the jury” was important to assure “ ‘a diffused 
 
 69. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). But see Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722–25 (2007) (finding that a diversity 
interest that is accomplished by focusing on race alone is unconstitutional and 
distinguishing the diversity interests of higher educational institutions). 
 70. See, e.g., Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1020–21, 1024–31 (considering the 
possibility that diversity is evidence of fairness and equality); id. at 1046–47 (considering 
the possibility that diversity is justified by its “discourse benefits”). 
 71. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 72. Id. at 85. 
 73. Id. at 86 (holding that a defendant has a right to a jury of peers—“ ‘that is, of his 
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which 
he holds’ ” (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880))). 
 74. 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 75. Id. at 129–31. 
 76. Id. at 138–39 (“Respondent offers virtually no support for the conclusion that 
gender alone is an accurate predictor of juror’s attitudes . . . .”); id. at 140 (reasoning that 
stereotypes about women “ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of 
men and women”); see also id. at 143–45 (noting that potential jurors who are women 
should be assessed on their individual characteristics rather than stereotypes). 
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impartiality,’ ”77 especially “in cases where gender-related issues are 
prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual harassment, or 
paternity.”78 Thus, even as the Court rejected reliance on stereotypes 
in jury selection on nondiscrimination grounds, it acknowledged that 
“ ‘the two sexes are not fungible’ ” and that “ ‘a community made up 
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of 
both.’ ”79 
The blended rationales in these cases seem to offer consistent 
and complementary justifications for diverse and inclusive juries. 
Discrimination is wrong because the perpetuation of invidious group 
stereotypes may infect the entire proceedings and lead to a loss of 
confidence in the judicial systems,80 while the diversity and 
representative character of the jury is necessary “ ‘as assurance of a 
diffused impartiality and . . . because sharing in the administration of 
justice is a phase of civic responsibility.’ ”81 In short, inclusion of 
women and minorities is necessary because it is both fair and 
representative. 
Despite the seemingly complementary nature of these 
justifications, there is also a fundamental tension between them. The 
discrimination argument presupposes that race and gender are 
irrelevant to juror qualifications and thus do not matter; the diversity 
argument, in contrast, posits that views and contributions vary based 
on race and gender, and thus that women and minorities should be 
represented.82 
Whether or not diversity reduces discrimination or improves the 
functioning of an enterprise is an empirical question, which should be 
resolvable through empirical research. The research, however, is not 
clear cut. Some evidence supports the view that diversity helps to 
reduce bias and stereotyping. Shin and Gulati refer to the utility of 
exposure to women and minorities in providing positive role models, 
or in debiasing the workplace.83 Numerous studies conclude that 
 
 77. Id. at 134 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)). 
 78. Id. at 140. 
 79. Id. at 133 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)). Ballard 
held “that women may not be excluded from the venire in federal trials in States where 
women were eligible for jury service under local law.” Id.; Ballard v. United States, 329 
U.S. 187, 193 (1946). 
 80. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.  
 81. Id. at 134 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1975)). 
 82. The concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor in J.E.B. gives more emphasis to the 
relevant differences between men and women, in the context of the intrusion of the 
opinion on the role of peremptory challenges in our jury system. Id. at 147–49 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).  
 83. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1042–43. 
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exposure to blacks and women reduces bias,84 that positive role 
models make a difference,85 and that interactions between members 
of different groups generate more positive attitudes between those 
groups.86 However, these positive effects do not always follow. With 
respect to intergroup contact, for example, it is important that 
members of the different groups have equal status, common goals, 
and support from leadership, and that there be interdependence 
between the groups.87 Positive effects may also be limited by how 
broadly the effects of an individual encounter can be generalized to 
the group as a whole. It is the nature of stereotypes that they tend to 
“repel disproving data,”88 often processing information that disprove 
the stereotype “as an exception to a robust rule of thumb, rather than 
a reason to modify the stereotype.”89 While some researchers have 
focused on the potential for intergroup contact to replace existing 
group boundaries and substitute a common group identity, others 
have concluded that positive attitudes are best generalized to other 
members of an outsider group when the salience of race or gender is 
preserved, at least to some extent.90 
The issue of whether diversity enhances the performance of a 
group is more contested, and thus will be addressed here in more 
detail. Researchers have extensively studied the impact of jury 
diversity on deliberations and verdicts. Research in earlier decades 
suggested that gender and race might have an impact on jury 
deliberation91 and somewhat of an effect on jury verdicts.92 More 
 
 84. Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1947–53 (citing studies). 
 85. Id. at 1947–48. 
 86. Id. at 1953–54. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1949. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1954–55. For a series of essays exploring research findings relating to the 
contact hypothesis, and issues still left to be explored, see generally ON THE NATURE OF 
PREJUDICE: FIFTY YEARS AFTER ALLPORT, supra note 34. 
 91. See, e.g., Catherine Kirchmeyer, Multicultural Task Groups: An Account of the 
Low Contribution Level of Minorities, 24 SMALL GROUP RES. 127, 137, 142–43 (1993) 
(finding that minorities contribute significantly less to decision making in small groups 
than non-minorities, and that persons scoring low in masculinity traits and high in 
femininity traits contribute significantly less than those scoring high in masculinity traits 
and low in femininity traits); Charlan Nemeth et al., From the ’50s to the ’70s: Women in 
Jury Deliberations, 39 SOCIOMETRY 293, 303 (1976) (finding in a mock jury experiment 
involving a murder case that male jurors were generally perceived to be more aggressive 
and confident than their female counterparts, although sex did not appear to be a factor 
with respect to the verdict or persuasiveness); Fred L. Strodtbeck et al., Social Status in 
Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 713, 715 (1957) (finding that men speak more 
frequently than women in mock jury deliberations); see also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE 
THE JURY 140–42 (1983) (finding in one mock jury study that males initiate about forty 
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recent research has confirmed some differences between men and 
women in certain kinds of cases,93 as well as the likelihood that 
diverse juries will deliberate longer and more thoroughly.94 In one 
study, racially diverse juries spent more time deliberating than did all-
white groups and spent their time discussing a wider range of case 
facts and perspectives.95 The study suggested that these effects were 
not just the product of greater information exchange within members 
of diverse juries, but also that whites “processed the trial information 
more systematically” within diverse groups; indeed, knowing that 
they were going to be deliberating with blacks appeared to cause 
whites to process the information more carefully even before the 
deliberations began.96 
Other jury research, however, has found little or no effect 
associated with gender or race. One comprehensive study based on 
jury surveys in 401 actual cases in Los Angeles; the Bronx; Maricopa 
County, Arizona; and the District of Columbia found no overall 
difference in participation rates based on gender, and, if anything, 
higher participatory rates among black jurors than those of other 
racial or ethnic backgrounds.97 Far more significant appear to be 
 
percent more comments than females, but concluding overall that there is no measurable 
difference based on gender). 
 92. See, e.g., James H. Davis et al., Victim Consequences, Sentence Severity, and 
Decision Processes in Mock Juries, 18 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
PERFORMANCE 346, 354 (1977) (finding in a mock jury study that women were more 
inclined toward finding guilt in rape cases than were males); Mary A. Gowan & Raymond 
A. Zimmermann, Impact of Ethnicity, Gender, and Previous Experience on Juror 
Judgments in Sexual Harassment Cases, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 596, 613 (1996) 
(finding that women are more likely to vote for the plaintiff in ambiguous sexual 
harassment cases); Eloise C. Snyder, Sex Role Differential and Juror Decisions, 55 SOC. & 
SOC. RES. 442, 444–45, 446 (1971) (finding that higher status litigants fare better before an 
all-male jury than a mixed-gender jury, and that mixed-gender juries award lower damages 
in civil trials); Cookie Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCHOL. 305, 308 
(1974) (finding that mock jurors favored defendants of their own sex in judgments of 
whether a defendant murdered his or her spouse). 
 93. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Golding et al., The Impact of Mock Jury Gender 
Composition on Deliberations and Conviction Rates in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 12 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 182, 187 (2007) (finding in a mock jury experiment, before jury 
deliberations in the case of an alleged sexual assault on a child, that men were more pro-
defense and women were more pro-prosecution). 
 94. See, e.g., Sommers, supra note 67, at 606. 
 95. Id. at 608. 
 96. Id. at 607. 
 97. See Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Contextualizing Jury Participation: 
Case-, Jury-, and Juror-Level Predictors of Participation in Jury Deliberations 28–29, 33, 
38 (July 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441537 (finding, 
overall, no difference in participation rates according to gender in a study based on jury 
surveys in 401 cases in Los Angeles, the Bronx, Arizona’s Maricopa County, and the 
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factors such as social class98 or whether a traditionally 
underrepresented group was in the majority.99 
Empirical research evaluating the difference women judges make 
in the courtroom has produced similarly mixed results.100 A number 
of studies have concluded that women judges bring different qualities 
to the bench and are more likely to decide certain cases, such as child 
support and sex discrimination, in favor of women.101 Other studies, 
 
District of Columbia, except for in Los Angeles, where gender differences appeared to be 
influenced by a higher number of Asian-American jurors, and higher participatory rates 
among black jurors than those of other racial or ethnic backgrounds); see also Andrea 
Hickerson & John Gastil, Assessing the Difference Critique of Deliberation: Gender, 
Emotion, and the Jury Experience, 18 COMM. THEORY 281, 297 (2008) (finding “no clear 
pattern of difference in the subjective assessment of jury deliberation” with regard to 
gender); Erin York & Benjamin Cornwell, Status on Trial: Social Characteristics and 
Influence in the Jury Room, 85 SOC. FORCES 455, 464 (2006) (finding that race and gender 
are not significant indicators of influence in jury deliberations). 
 98. See, e.g., Cornwell & Hans, supra note 97, at 36 (noting that social class “is 
increasingly the most pervasive status distinction in American society”); York & Cornwell, 
supra note 97, at 464 (finding influence in jury deliberations “is conferred nearly equally 
among males and females, [and among] whites and non-whites,” but influence is highly 
correlated with social class). 
 99. See Golding et al., supra note 93, at 187 (finding that women were more likely to 
change their verdict toward the prosecution in a female majority and toward the defense 
in a male majority mock jury). 
 100. Although there have been numerous studies comparing the impact of female 
judges, see infra notes 101–02, there do not appear to be comparable studies with respect 
to the race of judges. 
 101. See, e.g., David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, Role Orientations and Women State 
Supreme Court Justices, 77 JUDICATURE 156, 161 (1993) (stating that female state 
supreme court justices are more likely to support the woman’s position in cases involving 
child support, sex discrimination, sexual assault, birth control, and property settlement at 
divorce); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
299, 299 (2004) (finding that female judges impact their male counterparts in appellate 
panel decisions concerning issues traditionally thought to be important to females); 
Golding et al., supra note 93, at 182 (showing that women were more inclined to convict 
than men in a mock jury experiment involving the sexual assault of a six year old child); 
Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the 
Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005) (stating that female judges 
support female plaintiffs more often than did male judges); Donald R. Songer et al., A 
Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of 
Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 436 (1994) (same); Donald R. Songer & Kelly Crews-Meyer, Does 
Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 750, 759 
(2000) (proving that gender matters in obscenity and death penalty cases); James 
Stribopoulos & Moin Yahya, Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to 
Case Outcomes?: An Empirical Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, 45 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 315, 319 (2007) (showing in an Ontario study, female judges are more likely to 
rule in favor of a female party); see also Fiona Kay & Elizabeth Gorman, Women in the 
Legal Profession, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 299, 321 (2008) (reporting that some studies 
have shown that “female judges are more likely than their male colleagues to reach legal 
conclusion that favor the interests of women”). 
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including the most recent ones, have failed to confirm these 
observations, or have found to the contrary.102 
In trying to explain the discrepant research results on women 
judges, some researchers have posited that the differences between 
female and male judges are declining over time as women face less 
discrimination in their lives and compete on equal playing fields with 
their male counterparts.103 The decline of discrimination would 
predict that qualified women and minorities would not only be more 
plentiful at higher ranks as time goes on, but also, ironically, that their 
presence would make less difference. Research about the interaction 
effects of status and power further suggests that as race and gender 
stereotypes decrease, so will the interaction patterns that are affected 
by them.104 
Another possible explanation for the conflicting research data is 
that gender matters only, or mostly, when there is a critical mass of 
women judges. Some researchers have concluded that women tend to 
suppress the effects of their gender unless there is a sufficient number 
of other women involved in the same enterprise. The theory here is 
 
 102. See, e.g., Christina Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406 (2010) (finding few cases in which the gender of the judge 
seemed to make a difference); Sue Davis, Do Women Judges Speak “In a Different 
Voice?”: Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal Theory, and the Ninth Circuit, 8 WIS. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 143, 171 (1993) (finding no noticeable differences in the moral reasoning between 
male and female judges); Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender, Race, and Partisanship on 
the Michigan Supreme Court, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1205, 1232 (2000) (showing that the gender 
of a judge is far less significant than their political affiliation in sex discrimination and 
sexual harassment cases); Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the 
Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 147 (2000) 
(stating that female judges appointed by Democratic presidents are not more likely than 
male judges appointed by Democratic presidents to “serve the policy interests of their own 
communities”); Songer et al., supra note 101, at 425 (showing that gender is insignificant in 
obscenity and search and seizure cases); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The 
Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 607 
(1985) (stating that female judges appointed by Democratic presidents are not more likely 
than male judges appointed by Democratic presidents to rule for the female party in cases 
involving sex discrimination, sexual harassment, maternity rights, or reproductive 
freedom). 
 103. See Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial 
Appointment: A Re-Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 299 (2010); Madhavi 
McCall & Michael McCall, How Far Does the Gender Gap Extend?: Decision Making on 
State Supreme Courts in Fourth Amendment Cases, 1980–2000, 44 SOC. SCI. J. 67, 67 (2007) 
(showing that in recent years female justices have been more likely to rule in favor of 
criminal defendants than male justices, but this was not true prior to 1991). 
 104. See generally Cecelia L. Ridgeway & Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Gender System and 
Interaction, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 191 (1999) (demonstrating that research finding gender 
difference in peer interactions appear to be based on cultural beliefs about the general 
competence of men and women and of males’ higher status). 
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that women might have differences in perspective that they are not 
inclined to express without the support of other like-minded 
people.105 
The research with respect to the effects of diversity in corporate 
boardrooms is less voluminous than the research on juries and judges, 
but it is similarly mixed and inconclusive.106 These mixed results may 
also be explained by generational shifts in the women and minorities 
who are appointed to boards, or by factors related to critical mass. 
Earlier work by Mitu Gulati and Devon Carbado107 might also 
help to explain why the greater presence of women and minorities in 
 
 105. See, e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 102, at 390 (stating that “when a woman serves on 
a panel with men, the men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights 
litigant”); Gerard S. Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex 
Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143, 153 (1986) (concluding that having at least one 
female member is a significant factor in whether a state high court rules in favor of a 
female claimant in a sex discrimination case); Madhavi McCall, Structuring Gender’s 
Impact: Judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice Cases, 36 AM. POL. RES. 264, 290 (2008) 
(concluding that the number of women on the courts is a factor in judicial decision 
making). See generally Farhang & Wawro, supra note 101 (exploring whether and how 
racial minority and women appellate judges make a difference on issues thought to be of 
particular concern to women and minorities); Peresie, supra note 101 (analyzing whether 
the presence of female judges on three-judge federal appellate panels affects collegial 
decision making in a subset of gender-coded cases); Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 101 
(analyzing whether a judge’s party of appointment or gender matters to the outcome of 
cases). The classic work on the difficulties of token women in all-male institutions is 
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 206–42 (1977). 
More recent work on the subject includes DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE 
TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE 
BOARDROOM 109–19 (2007). 
 106. The other papers in this conference issue address the discrepancy in some detail. 
See, e.g., Brooke & Tyler, supra note 65, at 719–22 (reporting studies that have found 
positive links between diversity and business outcomes, and studies that do not, and 
highlighting the importance of institutional context); Broome et al., supra note 65, at 765–
67 (reviewing the studies and concluding that the impact of women and minorities on 
corporate boards has not been determined); Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate 
Board Gender Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional 
Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2011) (finding that corporate board gender 
diversity does not affect firm profitability but does positively affect stock value, probably 
because of institutional investor pro-gender bias); Fanto et al., supra note 62, at 902 
(“[E]mpirical studies to date have not supported the case for board diversity on 
shareholder value grounds.”); see also Broome et al., supra note 65, at 760–61 (finding that 
interviews of forty-five corporate insiders failed to yield many examples of women and 
minorities bringing different considerations to bear on board deliberation, or otherwise 
making a difference); Fairfax, supra note 62, at 858–59 (finding that there are instances in 
which board diversity and financial performance are linked, and others in which they are 
not). 
 107. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the Corporate 
Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2004) 
(arguing that minorities who successfully climb the corporate ladder are not likely to 
racially reform the corporation, nor engage in open-door activities for the minorities at the 
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corporate boardrooms has not necessarily made a difference to the 
quality of board performance. This work argues that in making 
diversity hires, majority decision makers will tend to choose those 
female and minority candidates who are most like themselves.108 
These successful women and minorities speak, move, and dress like 
those who select them. They went to the same schools, joined the 
same clubs, and share mutual friends. They know how to make their 
race and gender invisible, and thus less threatening. Once on a board, 
these individuals—so selected—continue to suppress differences in 
perspective, style, or priorities that otherwise might have made a 
difference to the board.109 Thus, while women and minorities might 
have made a difference to the workplaces and boards they join, these 
differences tend to be screened out, both before and after the 
selections occur. 
B. The Expressive Function of Diversity 
Given the mixed picture summarized above, one phenomenon is 
striking—the broad social consensus that diversity is a good thing. 
Patrick Shin argues that this consensus extends to the areas of 
corporate governance, education, and employment.110 Over sixty 
percent of today’s public, including sixty-six percent of people under 
the age of fifty, says that the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of 
the United States has been a change for the better.111 This consensus 
 
bottom). 
 108. Id. at 1658, 1672–77. Selection bias, and female and minority adaptation to this 
bias, flows from people’s basic psychological drive to identify most closely with, and thus 
favor, those who are most like themselves. This drive has been extensively documented in 
the social psychology literature. See, e.g., SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, 
REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 36–39 (2000); 
Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?, 55 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 429, 430 (1999). 
 109. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1677–90. 
 110. Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1190; see also 
Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. 
SOC. 1589, 1609–15 (2001) (tracing the rise of pro-diversity rhetoric in organizational 
management literature and education from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s); Erin Kelly & 
Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer 
Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 966–71 
(1998) (documenting growth in corporate diversity strategies, even in periods when equal 
opportunity laws were not vigorously enforced); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: 
The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management at UC-Berkeley, 
UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1020 (2007) (documenting 
consensus of administrators at three elite universities in favor of race-based affirmative 
action, despite some legal resistance). 
 111. News Release, The Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Current 
Decade Rated as Worst in 50 Years: Internet, Cell Phones are Changes for the Better 9 
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is reflected at this conference on corporate board diversity, where the 
question is not whether appointment of women and minorities to 
corporate boards is justified, but rather on what grounds the case for 
board diversity can be most credibly based.112 
This preference for diversity, however, is characterized by some 
ambiguity and ambivalence. Just as the Supreme Court’s defense of 
diversity on juries hedges between the relevance and irrelevance of 
race and gender, people support diversity based on a blend of 
nondiscrimination and diversity rationales that rest on contradictory 
premises. They reject stereotype-based discrimination, while also 
valuing diversity based on generalizations that amount to stereotypes. 
Even as they prefer diversity, people are often offended by the race- 
and gender-specific measures that would be necessary to bring it 
about.113 When they do engage in race- and gender-specific measures, 
the impulse is to replicate themselves insofar as possible, rather than 
risk stepping outside their own comfort zones.114 
Shin and Gulati mention, although they do not rely upon, an 
understanding of diversity that helps to transcend these contradictory 
impulses. This understanding is that diversity is “constitutive of the 
good of a community” and expresses the commitment toward “a 
certain ideal of justice or equality.”115 Within this view, diversity is a 
political and emotional vision of the kind of society in which people 
want to live. This vision rests on a societal ideal of heterogeneity. It 
posits and affirms a collective and individual identity in which women 
 
(Dec. 21, 2009), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/573.pdf; see also Broome et al., supra 
note 65, at 805 (“[A]ll of our interview subjects . . . agree with the abstract proposition that 
board diversity is a good thing.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 62, at 858–59 (highlighting that economic- and 
market-based rationales for board diversity are not enough and that “moral and social 
justifications” must still be taken into account); Fanto et al., supra note 62, at 906 (arguing 
that “diversity advocates should continue to offer different normative frameworks other 
than finance-based shareholder value to justify board diversity”). 
 113. Survey studies show that a majority of Americans, including women and people of 
color, are averse to identity-conscious diversity strategies. See, e.g., Alison M. Konrad & 
Frank Linnehan, Race and Sex Differences in Line Managers’ Reactions to Equal 
Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action Interventions, 20 GROUP & ORG. 
MGMT. 409, 428 (1995) (drawing conclusions based on interviews of line managers at four 
large companies). This aversion to identity-based strategies is well-represented on the 
current Supreme Court. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”). For a full and critical discussion of the various 
rationales for colorblindness, see Shin, supra note 110, at 1215–18. 
 114. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 107, at 1658. 
 115. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1020–21. For further exploration of this rationale, 
see Shin, supra note 110, at 1190. 
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and minorities can and do succeed.116 Because this understanding 
attaches to the norm rather than to an instrumental goal, it does not 
depend upon empirical evidence showing that it accomplishes a given 
purpose. Indeed, it is relatively indifferent to whether diversity is 
required to end discrimination, or to provide a full range of 
perspectives to a group and thus greater productivity. Either is 
possible, but neither is necessary. For people to feel best about 
themselves and the society in which they live, it is enough that 
opportunity appears, at least, to have been fairly distributed. 
Part III sketches the implications of this expressive rationale for 
the showcasing debate. 
III.  THE POSITIVE CASE FOR SHOWCASING 
If the real rationale for diversity appointments is the aspiration it 
expresses, showcasing serves the function of feeding people’s desire 
to be affirmed in this aspiration. Showcasing reflects their individual 
and collective self-image of a fair and diverse society. Seeing proof of 
progress toward that ideal helps people to continue to believe in its 
possibility and thus be more committed to it. 
There are reasons to be cynical. As others have observed, 
highlighting the visible “proof” of the success of some women and 
minorities can be self-deluding, obscuring the deeper, less diverse 
reality of a society stratified by race and gender.117 We are not likely 
to achieve race and gender equality if we fool ourselves into thinking 
we already have it. Why make people feel good about superficial 
achievements that mask continued race and gender privilege? Self-
delusion and ignorance are not promising conditions for a genuinely 
diverse and inclusive society. 
 
 116. And they suffer, collectively, when those women and minorities who seemed to 
represent success, fail. A notable example of both is Tiger Woods. His success was proof 
that people of mixed race could succeed in America; because of the importance of this 
reassurance, his reputational hit following disclosures of several extramarital affairs was 
arguably out of proportion to the seriousness of those disclosures. See Tiger Woods 
Scandal: $12 Billion Fallout?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2009), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/28/tiger-woods-scandal-12-bi_n_405228.html. 
 117. See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does 
Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1053–
54 (2009) (opposing focus on unconscious bias because it deludes people into thinking that 
conscious racism has disappeared, which it has not); Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious 
Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 942 (2008) (arguing that attention needs to focus on 
the ideology and material structures of white supremacy). 
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And yet, as we think pragmatically about how to achieve a more 
genuinely diverse and inclusive society, the positive affirmation of the 
value of diversity seems more productive than the cynical view of it. 
Affirmation reinforces and perpetuates the positive, and allows 
people to deepen their commitments to those norms freely, in a way 
that motivates and sustains nondiscriminatory, inclusive behaviors.118 
In contrast, coercion and shame tend to create anxiety, distance, and 
resentment—all emotions that work against the internalization of the 
desired norms.119 This is not to say that law should be abandoned; 
legal norms about nondiscrimination are necessary and should be 
clear, consistent, enforced, and modeled by respected leaders.120 That 
said, where actions—like showcasing—are ambiguous, a positive 
construction of those actions may better serve the goal of 
nondiscrimination and diversity than one that assumes the worst. 
Shin and Gulati criticize an “inside-out” approach to diversity 
because they say it assumes that change will come from well-
intentioned decision making.121 They contrast this approach to what 
they believe is a more plausible, “outside-in” approach, whereby 
diversity comes first, mandated if necessary, and then becomes a 
means by which implicit bias is eliminated.122  
The dichotomy they propose is a false one. The changes 
necessary to create a diverse and inclusive workplace are a product of 
complex interactions between external and internal norms, laws and 
voluntary action, structural and institutional barriers, and informal 
contact and friendships.123 The achievement of a diverse and inclusive 
workplace does not start either from purely voluntary, good 
intentions, or by legal mandate. It is, instead, the product of an 
ongoing synthesis of many dynamic influences and processes.124 Most 
people hold contradictory ideals, not easily susceptible to either easy 
reconciliation or rapid, permanent change. Within this complex 
reality, change does not come solely from within, or from without, but 
from ongoing, evolving resolutions of people’s conflicting principles.  
If this more dialectic model is accurate, company showcasing for 
the purpose of sending a positive message about the company is not 
 
 118. See Bartlett, supra note 21, at 1901, 1960–67, 1970–71. 
 119. Id. at 1966–67. 
 120. Id. at 1970. 
 121. Shin & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1051. 
 122. Id. at 1051–53. 
 123. See generally Bartlett, supra note 21 (arguing that positive affirmation of the 
values of diversity is a more productive way to instill a strong commitment to 
nondiscriminatory norms than strengthening the antidiscrimination laws). 
 124. Id. at 1941–56. 
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necessarily “corrosive” of diversity values, despite the potential 
dangers Shin and Gulati outline. Positive messages must be in the 
mix, along with ongoing reality checks. So are companies who are 
proud to have added more women and minorities to the organization 
in top places—even if those additions do not always reflect a deep or 
mature understanding of what a true commitment to diversity 
requires. 
It goes without saying that showcasing, in itself, is not enough. 
Far from it. To achieve diversity, companies need comprehensive, 
integrated, long-term policies, not single-shot, superficial actions.125 
But showcasing is one piece of a larger network of practices that can 
positively affect attitudes and expectations. Shin and Gulati do not 
give us good enough reasons to stamp it out. 
 
 
 125. Id. at 1960–71. 
